

**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

**THE JOINT CAMPAIGN GLASS CEILING – SUCCESSFULLY
BREAKING THE TRANSITION PHASE BARRIER**

BY

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL STEVEN P. APLAND
United States Army**

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
**Approved for Public Release.
Distribution is Unlimited.**

USAWC CLASS OF 2002



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

20020530 125

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**THE JOINT CAMPAIGN GLASS CEILING - SUCCESSFULLY BREAKING THE TRANSITION PHASE
BARRIER**

by

LIEUTENANT COLONEL STEVEN P. APLAND
United States Army

COLONEL STEPHEN KIDDER
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:

Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: LTC Steven P. Apland

TITLE: THE JOINT CAMPAIGN GLASS CEILING - SUCCESSFULLY BREAKING THE TRANSITION PHASE BARRIER

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 09 April 2002 PAGES: 28 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The military has created four phases to an operational campaign - Deter/Engage, Seize Initiative, Decisive Operations and Transition. The first three phases work remarkably well to achieve the desired military end state, however the Transition Phase - bringing operations to a successful conclusion (i.e., meeting the political end state) remains the key barrier to the joint campaign. Toward the end of decisive military operations, nonmilitary instruments of power become the leading effort in the operational arena. The Theater CINC has limited influence on diplomatic, economic and informational instruments, yet is held accountable for their effects on successfully completing the campaign. The CINC can only guaranty success given vastly improved integration of interagency efforts applied at the operational level.

This paper will analyze the challenges of successfully creating mutually satisfactory military and political conditions in the operational campaign. I will demonstrate the CINC's fundamental constraint from successfully accomplishing his political objectives during the transition phase of the campaign is failure to achieve unity of effort between the military and the interagency community. I will propose solving the unity of effort dilemma, by providing the CINC better interagency access through a dedicated interagency coordination cell to achieve greater military-Interagency integration. This operational military-interagency structure within the CINC's staff would be responsible for parallel political campaign planning and execution which can coherently tie the interagency process by phase to the military campaign. This organization must reside in the CINC's headquarters. Its span of influence could range from enabling effective interagency coordination and planning to actually directing operational policy within set, strategic restraints/constraints. The underlying goal is to provide the CINC with the tool to ensure successful transition from decisive combat operations to the desired political end state and sets the conditions for lasting peace.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
THE JOINT CAMPAIGN GLASS CEILING - SUCCESSFULLY BREAKING THE TRANSITION PHASE BARRIER	1
IF YOUR TOOLBOX CONTAINS ONLY HAMMERS – EVERYTHING LOOKS LIKE A NAIL	1
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF POST HOSTILITY OPERATIONS: GERMANY VERSUS PANAMA.....	2
WORLD WAR II: OPERATION ECLIPSE AND THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY	2
THE REMOVAL OF NORIEGA AND RESTORATION OF A FREE PANAMA.....	5
CONTRAST: ECLIPSE – PROMOTE LIBERTY	8
THE EVOLUTION OF INTERAGENCY INVOLVEMENT IN MILITARY OPERATIONS	8
CULTURAL AND PROFESSIONAL CHALLENGES	9
INTERAGENCY POLICY AND JOINT DOCTRINE MERGE	9
WHAT'S MISSING IN POLICY AND JOINT DOCTRINE FOR TRANSITION OPERATIONS	10
SOLUTION: CREATE AN OPERATIONAL INTERAGENCY CELL ON THE CINC'S STAFF.....	11
ORGANIZATION AND ROLES OF THE OPERATIONAL INTERAGENCY DIRECTORATE	13
ROLES OF THE OPERATIONAL INTERAGENCY DIRECTORATE.....	14
CONCLUSION.....	15
ENDNOTES	17
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	21

THE JOINT CAMPAIGN GLASS CEILING - SUCCESSFULLY BREAKING THE TRANSITION PHASE BARRIER

"The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose."

— Clausewitz¹

IF YOUR TOOLBOX CONTAINS ONLY HAMMERS – EVERYTHING LOOKS LIKE A NAIL

Current joint doctrine describes four distinct phases during an operational campaign: 1) Deter/Engage, 2) Seize Initiative, 3) Decisive Operations and 4) Transition/Post Hostilities.² We execute the first three phases quite satisfactorily. The U.S. military can deter aggression and if required, decisively defeat any adversary. Bringing an operational campaign to its successful political conclusion - (i.e., the Transition/Post Hostilities Phase)³ remains our key barrier.

Tying military means and ways to political ends has progressed little from the Clausewitzian paradigm of bending another nation to our political will or simply conquering it. Our military's current task is not only to defeat an enemy but restore him to a sovereign, self-sustaining, peaceful member in the international community as well.⁴ Nation building is a radical task for an instrument designed for destruction. Termination of war does not equate to the emergence of peace – there is a transition between the two.⁵ Military professional study of war termination and the promotion of peace pales compared to the study of deterring and fighting wars.⁶ While our diplomatic, economic and informational instruments of power are the best tools for nation building, many claim our joint warfighting superiority has in fact served to atrophy our other instruments of power.⁷

The fundamental question is – “Why is the U.S. so ineffectual in tying her superior military, diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of power together and restoring the peace after she has succeeded in vanquishing her adversaries.” The answer lies in the nation’s inability to combine its military and nonmilitary tools at the operational level. The operational level is where campaigns are planned and executed. Without unity of effort focused on the strategic, political objective - transition to post hostilities will invariably be found wanting. Our floundering in Haiti, Somalia, the Balkans are just examples of our failure to reach our political end state.

History shows us we have not always been impotent in providing for lasting peace after military victory. The Northern Army’s mission of occupation, and restoration of the South at the end of our civil war was our first successful endeavor at providing for the peace. This was by no means a quick and clean process. The 12 year reconstruction period was one of the most

controversial eras in American history, often referred to as the “Age of Hate.” Its negative effects have spanned generations.⁸ Southern reconstruction was a classical Clausewitzian example of a post-hostilities military operation – subjugation of the Southern States’ political will as we enveloped them into our sovereign territory. It does not reflect the political and ideological constraints of the modern era.

The Second World War provides the best example of restoring defeated enemies to stable, peaceful global partners. Both Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan seemed bent on shaping the world into their fiefdoms. Now both nations are models of political and economic viability. The U.S. is primarily responsible for these transformed nations. Panama, a more recent vanquished foe showed little of the political and economic resilience of Japan or Germany. What is different?

The manner in which we wield the full spectrum of national power has changed. The U.S. can no longer overlook its nonmilitary instruments as it did in Post World War II. We have become more efficient in integrating our instruments of power. However with that efficiency, we have lost our effectiveness – at least in the operational level. Without closer integration to the nonmilitary instruments at the operational level – the military will remain the wrong tool for building lasting peace.

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF POST HOSTILITY OPERATIONS: GERMANY VERSUS PANAMA

Setting the conditions for lasting peace outweigh the conditions for outright military victory. The Treaty of Versailles at the conclusion of World War I and its effects leading to World War II demonstrated the consequences of winning war but neglecting peace.⁹ Our post hostility and transition efforts after the defeat of Nazi Germany and the Noriega’s Panama demonstrate U.S. adaptations to the phenomenon of winning the peace. They further serve to illustrate the current operational shortfall in military capabilities to smoothly transition from military operations to civil control.

WORLD WAR II: OPERATION ECLIPSE AND THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY

The study of Operation ECLIPSE is especially relevant in transition operations. It was both joint and combined in nature and applied to a completely destroyed German state. Two key distinctions to the Post WW II German model must be kept in mind. First, the scale of conflict and availability of resources to restore a nation are unlikely to occur in the future. Second is the lack of interagency participation at an operational level. While a model of success in transitioning from war to nation restoration, the military was relatively free to

integrate the collective elements of national power without domestic or government agency oversight.

The U.S. Military's role in reestablishing Germany as a sovereign state provides some perennial insights. Our political leaders can seldom give clear guidance on achieving the political end state at the start of war. There are domestic, coalition or allied divisions as to political end state. The leaders of the three Allies could not agree on the political objectives for a defeated Germany during the Casablanca Conference in January 1943.¹⁰ Also, the military leadership must plan for the peace desired with or without guidance. This is precisely what General Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, did. Without political guidance, he planned post hostilities operations designed to seize critical infrastructure nodes and disarm the German military.¹¹ Eisenhower and his staff modified the plan in July of 1944, after appreciating the complexities of liberating occupied territory. The plan became Operation ECLIPSE.¹² ECLIPSE provided for "De-Nazification" of Germany and rehabilitating it back to economic viability. Creating the plan is easy. Executing it without policy guidance is another matter – even in the 1940's. Eisenhower had the military resources to execute the plan. What he lacked was political authority. With the help of General Marshall he gained the mechanisms to integrate the necessary nonmilitary instruments to rebuild Germany.

President Roosevelt created a cabinet committee in September 1944 to form post-war policy for Germany at the strategic level. The committee included the Secretary's of War, State and Treasury. It served to coordinate U.S. interests with the Allies' European Advisory Committee (EAC) formed in December 1943. This executive committee failed to solidify a coherent post hostility policy but gave Eisenhower a position from which he could integrate operational and strategic policy¹³ He had access and insight on political deliberations - the birth of the interagency coordination process. For the first time in U.S. history, military leaders attempted to coherently integrate other instruments of power with the military in the prosecution of a campaign.

At the operational level, Eisenhower created a cell devoted to post hostilities operations. This cell, named the Post Hostilities Planning Subsection (PPS) coordinated and directed subordinate military units specifically trained in conducting nonmilitary ECLIPSE operations. The PPS provided liaison at the tactical level and produced the Handbook Governing Policy and Procedures for Military Occupation in Germany.¹⁴ He further organized a cell called the European Civil Affairs Division (ECAD) to interpret strategic guidance from the EAC, advise on civil affairs policy, and issue civil affairs guidance to subordinate commanders and supervise execution.

At the tactical level, the EACD further organized country civil affairs units for each liberated/occupied country. Each country unit was specifically resourced and trained to assist in getting its designated country back on its feet economically as rapidly as possible. Clearly, the linkage from tactical to strategic levels was largely influenced by Gen Marshall's and Gen Eisenhower's strategic vision of a post war Europe.

Eisenhower's vision of a stable, economically viable Germany wasn't politically unanimous. Members of the administration, congress as well as our Allies saw a rejuvenated Germany as a threat. The opposing view, as articulated in the Morgenthau Plan, was to create a completely de-industrialized Germany, capable of only a subsistence economy. The Morgenthau Plan was implemented via JCS Directive 1067 late in 1944, however because Eisenhower had direct access to the policy making mechanism, he was able to mitigate the effects of the Plan.¹⁵ As long as Gen Eisenhower honored allied political policy to demilitarize German industry and extract war reparations mandated by the Yalta Conference in January 1945, he was free to set the economic and political conditions to restore Germany. Furthermore, the Morgenthau Plan provided for a military governor, which coalesced economic and internal political instruments under Eisenhower's authority.

Eisenhower appointed Gen Lucius Clay as Deputy Military Governor and created the Office of Military Government for Germany (OMGUS) to serve as his post hostility operations staff.¹⁶ Clay, a Georgia native born in 1898, experienced the effects of Civil War Reconstruction exploitation; he wanted no part in the exploitation of the Germans.¹⁷ His strategy was enfranchisement of non-fascist German military and civil leaders in their own nation's reformation. Clay developed German cooperation and expanded local industrial and governmental agencies to regional systems – *Laender Governments*.¹⁸ Eventually, the British and French sectors of German Territory recognized the efficiency of the American system and began similar practices.¹⁹

Clay's military government structure lacked any nonmilitary agencies. He created his own under the direction of Eisenhower by converting thousands of military personnel into civilian administrators as part of the post WW II American demobilization process.²⁰ He clearly recognized that accomplishing ECLIPSE's Herculean objectives required exercising political, economic and informational instruments.²¹ Within 18 months of occupation, West Germany began showing the resiliency to rise from the ashes of the Third Reich and become a viable partner in the Western European community. Only the shortage of resources, later provided by the MARSHALL PLAN, stood in the way of complete German recovery. Eisenhower set the

conditions for the political end state in the final phase of the military campaign by conducting post hostility operations and transitioning to a civilian control of his own making.

The political infighting in the president's cabinet and the short-sightedness of the EAC allowed Eisenhower to pursue a nation building strategy largely without domestic political or interagency oversight. Even in the face of competing policy objectives, Eisenhower had the necessary access at the strategic level to continue his vision of a Post WW II Germany. Operation ECLIPSE took military operations of the European Campaign to complete closure - completing post hostility operations, transferring control to civilian agencies and ultimately supporting a stable regime change. Vast resources and governorship gave the military unprecedented control of the civil instruments of power within the theater. While Eisenhower's strategy was inefficient, requiring hundreds of thousands of military personnel to accomplish, no one can argue with its effectiveness.

THE REMOVAL OF NORIEGA AND RESTORATION OF A FREE PANAMA

Operation JUST CAUSE demonstrates an evolution of interagency community involvement in the Transition/Post Hostilities Phase of an operational campaign plan. Linkage of military objectives to political objectives was considerable. The first national instrument to be used against Noriega was political. Congress passed a resolution in June 1987 calling for Dictator Manuel Noriega to step down. Economic sanctions would follow to compel Noriega to recognize the new democratically elected government on 7 May 1989. Charges of drug trafficking, harassment of American citizens, interference with the 1987 Panama Canal Treaty, and harboring Libyan terrorists were levied against Noriega. The conditions for U.S. military operations to force a regime change in support of American vital interests had been met.²² In February 1988, JCS directed USCINCSOUTH, Gen Woerner Jr., to plan an operational campaign to remove Noriega and assist the new Panamanian government.²³ Unlike ECLIPSE, the NCA and DoD recognized the requirement to integrate nonmilitary and military operations at the commencement of the deliberate campaign planning cycle.²⁴ The campaign plan contained the four operational phases, including the post hostilities phase, to restore the stability of a new Panamanian Government. The plan, BLUE SPOON, included restoring public and economic services, and coordinating with Panamanian civic leaders for future regime needs, and creating a Panamanian Defense Force and civilian police force to support the new democratic government.

President Reagan approved the campaign to allow a unified interagency campaign to exert diplomatic and economic instruments to compel Noriega's removal. The principal

agencies included the Defense, State, Justice, Treasury and Commerce departments.²⁵ This was a new approach in national strategy. There was a clear political objective – the removal of Noriega – on which all instruments were focused with a more coherent involvement of the interagency community.

During May and June 1989, the NSC created a Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) to synchronize instruments of national power to compel regime change and restore Panamanian stability. However, even with increased interagency involvement in the planning, the PCC's efforts focused on supporting decisive military operations rather than integrated actions aimed at restoring Panama.²⁶ Post hostility operations remained for the most part an afterthought. The only significant interagency policy for post hostility operations planning was Rules Of Engagement to prevent damage to infrastructure.

In May 1989, the new CINCSOUTH, General Thurman, significantly changed BLUE SPOON to become more decisive and renamed the campaign plan, JUST CAUSE. This supported newly elected President Bush's more aggressive policy to force a regime change.²⁷ A coherent political-military strategy began to separate. Military ways and means shifted while nonmilitary plans remained constant. The post hostilities and transition phase, PROMOTE LIBERTY, retained its essential tasks and end state.²⁸

The invasion of Panama commenced with concurrent execution of intermediate military and political objectives. Several hours before H-hour, 0100 hrs. 20 January 1989, Ambassador Bushnell and Gen Thurman briefed President Elect Endara and V. Presidents Elect Calderon and Ford of the campaign.²⁹ Civil affairs and military police units deployed with combat forces to conduct post hostilities operations. The initial key tasks included public safety, health issues and population control. These tasks were Civil Military Operations (CMO) – the military would coordinate its actions with nonmilitary agencies representatives on the ground, but rely on Washington for specific policy decisions pertaining to the operation. The initial CMO tasks received little interference because of their significance to the military objectives. Later tasks of rebuilding commerce, assisting in political reforms and restructuring the PDF into police, customs, and defense forces, lacked the same unity of effort.³⁰

As operations progressed, complexities emerged to highlight the lack of operational integration between the CINC and the interagencies. Noriega escaped and took refuge in the Vatican "Nunciata" Mission complex. Thurman had no readily available policy to deal with the political nuances of Vatican sovereignty. Unclear policy guidance on isolating Cuban and Nicaraguan interference without infringing on diplomatic immunity privileges had already created political friction when U.S. forces improperly detained "Cuban diplomats" and unlawfully

searched and seized weapons at the Nicaraguan embassy. For nearly two weeks, U.S. objectives in Panama were at risk waiting for interagency efforts to create a coherent strategy to obtain Noriega. The famous "Rock Music Assault" upon the Nunciata was an ill-advised military action significantly damaging public information operations. Gen Thurman would not have faced such difficulties had sufficient interagency support been on the ground to advise him and integrate political policy to handle unforeseen events.

The Joint History Office's after action account implies post hostilities and transition operations had to be managed at the strategic level. General Powell took the lead. His rationale being "politico-military" factors loomed larger than military ones, and Thurman was being asked to make decisions of a politically sensitive nature.³¹ Because of political embarrassment, only Powell could unify operational political-military efforts with his direct access to the President and Secretary of Defense and other nonmilitary agencies. Thurman had to rely completely on the Chairman. If Thurman had the same access to the interagency community at the operational level from the onset, these "embarrassments" might not have occurred or at minimum, been mitigated.

The conditions created by the transition efforts during the next 12 months shed further insight on ill effects caused by the weaknesses in interagency coordination. Without complete access to the interagency capabilities, Thurman had little capability to effect the successful transition of Panama to a stable democratic environment under the Endara presidency. There was no integrated strategy nor unity of effort. Simply, there was no one in charge, and our political objectives fell short in Panama. The U.S. failed to make good its pledge of \$1 billion to repair damages caused by U.S. economic sanctions and subsequent combat. Political attention waned, Congress provided only \$120 million by the invasion's first anniversary. We failed to consider Noriega's legal issues before apprehension. He received POW status and pay despite his conviction and incarceration. A small economic cost but significant legal-political implications in our war against terrorism. The Justice and Treasury Departments likely unknowingly allowed untold millions of dollars to escape confiscation because of little linkage with SOUTHCOM's intelligence efforts. The training of the new Panamanian military Public Force was unsatisfactory and within the first 12 months they could not adequately provide for the public safety. Violent crime in Panama tripled compared to the previous year. The new Endara government failed to sustain civil salary payment causing increased public strikes and school closures. The medical system suffered. The political system bore numerous allegations of continued corruption. By December, 1990, 63% of Panamanian public believed that the U.S. invasion of Panama brought more harm to their country than good.³²

CONTRAST: ECLIPSE – PROMOTE LIBERTY

The contrast between the German and Panamanian campaigns demonstrates our challenge in integrating national instruments to achieve political objectives. Somehow, in the process of creating efficiency, we have slid back in our effectiveness. Eisenhower contended with extensive infrastructure damage, unprecedented human suffering, and a complete emasculation of civil government from the local to national level. Military authority to govern domestic policy, establish rules of law, and restore the German economy worked quite well. True, there were no discussions on post war goals as American forces entered into the war. The political leadership's focus was survival – not redefining central Europe. Without interagency integration, Eisenhower created one of the world's most stable governments. By the end of the 20th century, the U.S. was both unable and unwilling to divest its political interests entirely to military stewardship. The U.S. could no longer apply divisions of troops to a post World War II model. Transition from military victory to restoring of a nation could be best accomplished through interagency integration. Political objectives such as a post-Noriega Panama were articulated clearly prior to invasion. A clear political vision should have focused the interagency efforts to a clear transition and exit strategy for the military while meeting the political objectives. Yet, it did not.

The fundamental difference between Germany and Panama is unity of effort at the operational level. Thurman lacked Eisenhower's access to the political leadership to achieve the final political solution. Neither model is sufficient to deal with threats in our current Global War Against Terrorism (GWOT). A post German War solution in Afghanistan is infeasible – a Panamanian solution is unacceptable.

THE EVOLUTION OF INTERAGENCY INVOLVEMENT IN MILITARY OPERATIONS

It is important to evaluate the evolution in interagency coordination to determine how we have developed the mechanisms. We must look at the task and purpose of the process to determine a better way to integrate our national instruments at the operational level.

Interagency is not defined in JP 1-02, *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 12 April 2001. The term is widely recognized as the institution of the collective governmental agencies which the President can use to wield the nonmilitary instruments of national power.

U.S. policy has increasingly used military power toward military operations other than war (MOOTW). U.S. military operations after DESERT STORM have been largely in response to nonmilitary threats vice military threats to our national interests. The major theater of war (MTW) paradigm was replaced by the small scale contingency (SSC). Using the military in

SSC's to accomplish limited military but expanded political objectives, has placed the theater CINC's in a challenged environment – both culturally and professionally. It is an environment where seemingly every step requires new policy to guide the CINC's actions.

CULTURAL AND PROFESSIONAL CHALLENGES

American strategic culture views the military as the tool of last resort.³³ Historically, the use of military signals diplomatic failure. Now, use of the military may be the result of diplomatic success. Until the 1990's, the interagency members wielding the other instruments of power conceptually isolated themselves from the military. This notion has not entirely changed today. The new SSC paradigm forced a greater degree of desegregation between the military and the interagency communities to achieve more complex objectives. Yet the perception that military power in some way undermines the efforts of the other instruments of power prevails.³⁴ "Synergy, which should have resulted from the increasing integration of the interagency community and the military required a premise of close, interdependent relationship between the two"³⁵ – has not yet occurred on its own.

True integration requires professional competence and established mechanisms as well as cultural change. The lack of individuals skilled in understanding each others' organizational capabilities as well as comprehensive organizational tools prevents the CINC from obtaining synergy. Neither the interagency community nor the military had clear direction on how to achieve unity of effort in accomplishing mutual or supporting objectives – unless the President gave specific, detailed guidance – a commodity which is both unrealistic and inefficient.

INTERAGENCY POLICY AND JOINT DOCTRINE MERGE

Interagency coordination processes at national level were codified through the National Act of 1947 (NSA-47). NSA-47 created the National Security Council (NSC) to conduct interagency coordination to execute national security policy both internationally and domestically. This process is effective at the strategic level. Its value is marginal at the operational level.

By presidential direction, interagency coordination advanced during the last decade. In 1994, President Clinton directed a review of current policies and capabilities for MOOTW. As a result, the military community produced joint doctrine, JP 3-07, MOOTW Operations, dated 16 June 1995. JP 3-07 indirectly addresses the transition phase of the military campaign plan since MOOTW dominates post hostility operations.³⁶ President Clinton also issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, "Instructions for Peace Operations."³⁷ His intent was to improve

integration among all government agencies during peace operations, a specific MOOTW which the U.S. had become increasingly involved – e.g., Somalia, Haiti. The resulting dialogue demonstrated policy integration requirements reached across the entire spectrum of SSC's. On 20 May 1997, President Clinton issued PDD-56, "Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations."³⁸ PDD-56 advanced both policy and interagency community mechanisms to synchronize activities in SSCs. PDD-56 directed the NSC to form ad hoc policy coordinating committees (PCCs) to create policy for a particular complex contingency in order to focus national efforts.³⁹ PDD-56 also created the requirement of a Political-Military (POLMIL) Plan to define and achieve political objectives for a given contingency.⁴⁰ The POLMIL plan forces unity of effort by directing governmental organizations to set synchronized conditions to the operational campaign plan. These are strategic level directives that provide only marginally improved operational unity of effort.

Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, volumes I and II, 9 October 1996, addresses interagency community integration.⁴¹ It recognizes interdependence of both the civil agencies' and the military's respective missions and the need to closely coordinate efforts regardless of philosophical and operational differences.⁴² JP 3-08 attempted to create procedures to facilitate operational coordination. Its success is limited however, because the CINC is a facilitator rather than an executor in the process. Mutual courses of action and end states would be solicited with the goal of efficiently pooling resources.

⁴³ It stressed that the CINC and his staff would be bound to the Secretary of the Army's policy for domestic operations and the appropriate ambassador(s)' abroad – as well as answering to the Secretary of Defense.⁴⁴ The CJCS is the principle link between the CINC and those whom provide strategic policy. JP 3-08 also correctly assumed the NSC and its appropriate PCC would be a significant role player. The CINC would consequently answer to several masters in a much more complex environment.

WHAT'S MISSING IN POLICY AND JOINT DOCTRINE FOR TRANSITION OPERATIONS

Direct access at the operational level to policy coordination has been further removed by the façade of integration mechanisms. PDD-56 and emerging joint doctrine started integration of national instruments of power to achieve unity of effort in SSC's. They have not gone far enough. PDD-56 does not, nor did it intend to apply to combat operations.⁴⁵ Even if applied to a wartime campaign construct, the changing makeup of the PCCs as an ad hoc organization tailored to a specific contingency makes it extremely cumbersome for the CINC to obtain

consistent guidance throughout the campaign. This changing membership of a policy-creating organization and consequent shift in methodology of individual committees require constant dialogue with the CINC and his staff to maintain a productive relationship at the strategic and operational levels. The CINC is limited in this ability as it is currently the role of the CJCS to “represent the concerns of the combatant commander in the NSC.”⁴⁶ Furthermore, doctrine based on presidential decision authority is short-sighted. What happens if the current or future Presidents decide to do away with the decision? How does the CINC access policy guidance then?

Joint doctrine development has only added levels of efficiency to a fundamentally inefficient system. It focuses on coordination to effect the interagency processes in the attempt to achieve unity of effort. Joint doctrine is one-sided policy only – applicable to the military exclusively. JP 3-08 is sufficiently vague in its structure and consistency and some argue that the “take charge” military culture steps in to fill those voids.⁴⁷ This approach is culturally counterproductive in the long term.

There is perhaps a more dangerous development caused by the patterns of political and doctrinal development in interagency coordination with respect to the military campaign. Ad hoc policy organizations are least likely to be effective at fighting our nations wars and setting conditions providing for lasting peace. Both PDD-56 and JP 3-08 rely on standing up organizations at the time of need. Doctrinally, the CINC is advised to create an Interagency Planning Cell (IPC) upon receipt of alert or warning order and provide liaison with associated agencies to enable coordination.⁴⁸ Where does he draw these people from? What is the level of their expertise? Who covers down on their warfighting planning and execution tasks? Both Eisenhower and Thurman focused their collective efforts at winning their wars. To do less would jeopardize their military objectives and cost lives. Political leadership suffers from the same distractions as the military commander. With leaders and their staff devoted to both combat and post hostilities – which scenario gets priority? Post hostility planning and coordination will continue as crisis action responses without the crisis level intensity.

SOLUTION: CREATE AN OPERATIONAL INTERAGENCY CELL ON THE CINC’S STAFF.

PCC’s and their strategic policy decisions work to create broad, integrated plans for the interagency community. Their effectiveness deteriorate at the operational level. Strategic policy is too cumbersome to adapt to the fog of war and a rapidly changing environment caused by a thinking enemy. The CINC must have access to policy making mechanisms as much as practical to synchronize all instruments toward the campaign. Ideally, an operational campaign

will best succeed under unity of command. However it is politically unlikely to allow military complete control over the interagency community at the operational level.

There must be a mechanism which could integrate the civilian agencies with the military at the operational level. This concept requires an organization specifically established to combine all elements of national power at the theater level where operational campaigns are planned and executed. There are two alternative strategies to create such a mechanism.

The first strategy is to create a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) with the capacity for interagency coordination of operational planning matters.⁴⁹ The JIACG would be an organization comprised of a small number of military and civilians with agency expertise and connections. The JIACG could be positioned on each CINC's staff or a single JIACG placed in Washington under the State Department, OSD or JCS to support all CINCs' campaign planning. U.S. Joint Forces Command developed this concept and will test it during the MILLENIUM CHALLENGE 2002 Joint Warfighting Experiment on July 24 – 15 August 2002.

The second strategy would be to create a CINC's Interagency Policy Directorate (CIAP) within each combatant command. This organization is identical to the JIACG construct except the CIAP would be empowered with limited authority to direct as well as coordinate interagency activities at the operational level. The CIAP would perform mission analysis and provide a recommended POLMIL input to the PCC. The PCC established by the NSC could review, adopt, or modify the CIAP's input and create the strategic political objectives for presidential approval. The PCC's POLMIL plan setting the strategic ways and means could delegate operational authority over specific nonmilitary instruments to the CIAP as it deems appropriate to apply in the operational campaign.

The CIAP would produce its own operational POLMIL plan identifying the task and purpose of each nonmilitary instrument. As part of the campaign plan approval process, the POLMIL plan would outline military conditions for transition/post hostilities operations and political conditions for the end state. The POLMIL plan would not only contain the exit strategy but the interagency capabilities and tasks required to meet the end state. This document would serve as the CINC's request for interagency resources. Once the operational POLMIL plan is approved, it becomes a warning or alert document for the supporting agencies. In essence, the CINC would be given a greater role in the development of the operational POLMIL plan, and once approved by the strategic PCC, have the ability to closely integrate with the nonmilitary instruments of power. This method would not only improve unity of effort at the operational level, but gives the CINC unity of effort with all tools applied to achieve the end state.

The JIACG concept is a dramatic improvement in interagency coordination. It shows vast potential in finally integrating the interagency planning and execution at the operational level. It will most likely not go far enough. The JIACG must not reside in Washington. It will not be responsive enough to the CINC because of conflicting priorities and loyalties. What happens if more than one CINC requires the JIACG's efforts? Additionally, the JIACG concept may resort to an ad hoc organization, stood up only during a contingency. It will be ineffectual in the deliberate planning process for Concept Plans or ongoing Theater Engagement Plans.

The CIAP concept presents considerable cultural and professional hurdles which can not easily be overcome. However, it places in the hands of the CINC the level of control to use all instruments of power during the prosecution of war. He could shape interagency operations to better set conditions during post hostilities for a lasting peace and transition the military out of the campaign. It is a standing organization on the CINC's staff focused exclusively on his theater resourced with governmental agency authorizations.

Both concepts require new policy via Presidential Decision Authority (PDA) to ensure operational interagency integration as PDD-56 did at the strategic level.⁵⁰ But even PDA is an interim step. Congressional legislation equal to the Goldwater-Nichols act of 1986 must be passed to mandate and resource governmental agency authorizations within the combatant commanders' headquarters. It is time we evolve from the Joint-Purple paradigm to the paradigm of *Gold*.⁵¹ Furthermore, Executive and Legislative policy mandating interagency personnel integration will develop the professional competence necessary for both civilian and military members to effectively work together. Reducing the cultural barriers between civilian and military bureaucracies will take time and not be easy. It took years for the military to appreciate the value of service advocacy versus parochialism under Goldwater-Nichols. A mandated, standing interagency organization on each combatant commander's staff will accelerate the cultural transformation to the *Gold* Paradigm.

ORGANIZATION AND ROLES OF THE OPERATIONAL INTERAGENCY DIRECTORATE.

Whether we create an interagency organization on the CINC's staff as purely a planning and coordination instrument (JIACG) or an organization with limited policy authority (CIAP), this cell must have principal directorship status. To overcome the professional and cultural barriers, its leadership must be viewed as an equal with both the J-5 (Plans and Policy) and J-3 (Current Operations) directorates, but must be inseparably integrated in their functionality. POLMIL plans must be closely linked to military concept and campaign plans. POLMIL coordination must be equally linked with ongoing military operations. The CIAP should be directed by a

military planner, but it is logical for the cell to have a nonmilitary deputy director with senior-level State Department experience. A former ambassador would be ideal and should go through a similar nomination process as any general or flag officer. The civilian deputy director would provide invaluable access into the interagency community by signaling civil oversight in POLMIL operations. His position and access to the CINC would signal his authority in POLMIL matters to the military. The civilian deputy would bring the professional competence in negotiating the political, cultural, philosophical and professional nuances of interagency coordination.

Currently, NSC standing membership includes the NSA, DCI, Secretaries of Treasury, Justice and Homeland Defense, and the Office of the Assistant to the President's Economic Policy Advisor. These agencies should be represented on the JIACG or CIAP staff as well. A member of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) should also be a standing member of the operational staff. USAID has tremendous potential in supporting post hostility and SSC operations. Policy should mandate periodic rotations to promulgate cross-fertilization of operational interagency expertise. The lines of communication with interagency community counterparts at the strategic level would become institutionalized. Over time, the subsequent rotations from CINC staff back to their agency would foster closer integration between all instruments of power.

Military membership in the directorate is equally necessary. Administrators, logisticians, planners and operators could produce plans, manage execution and translate operational concepts into a common interagency language and vice versa. Military personnel serving in the interagency directorate would gain an invaluable understanding of the interagency process that would continue to foster those competencies throughout the military community. Within several years, a pool of individuals throughout the military and interagency community would possess the competence in operational integration to assist in developing "Gold" doctrine and TTP's. Additionally, the operational interagency cell could enlist specific non-standing agency members necessary for a specific contingency.

ROLES OF THE OPERATIONAL INTERAGENCY DIRECTORATE

The principle role of the directorate would be to produce Phase IV, POLMIL Plan (Post hostilities/Transition) of a war campaign plan, or Annex V, interagency coordination annex of a SSC campaign plan. They could articulate interagency capabilities against operational requirements and fill the current void of ensuring integration of all instruments of national power to set conditions for political objectives. As a standing directorate, it would advise the CINC and create plans for post hostilities and transition concurrent with the rest of the campaign plan. Its

members would stay focused on the consequences of military plans and operations and anticipate adjustments based on the current operational and strategic setting. The directorate would mirror the strategic capabilities of the NSC at an operational level. Under the CIAP option, the directorate would also fuse J-5 and J-3 directorates' responsibilities for POLMIL plans and execution. During campaign planning the directorate would: determine civil agency tasks; issue directives to agencies when given authority by the NSC; and synchronize agencies' entry into theater with combat forces. During campaign prosecution, the directorate would: monitor operations; anticipate requirements and direct action minimizing the distraction to warfighting efforts; maintain focus on the objective by keeping the CINC apprised of the impacts on the final phase of the campaign; and identify decisive points for post hostility operations. Once decisive military operations have concluded, the directorate would have a coherent post hostilities and transition plan based on current operational conditions. Branch and sequel plans for Phase IV would be a reality. The directorate would also support tactical, in-theater missions through the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) in support of the CJTF's/CINC's intent.

The interagency directorate would also be instrumental in deliberate planning. Operation (OPLANS) and concept plans (CONPLANS) would finally show substance in post hostility and exit strategies. The CINC's peacetime strategy of engagement with nation-states within his AOR is fundamental to creating and maintaining regional stability. The interagency directorate is ideally suited to develop and execute more focused, comprehensive theater engagement plans (TEPs). Interagency members on the CINC's staff could dialogue with governmental agencies regarding their respective efforts in the theater, providing better situational awareness. The potential for synchronization increases dramatically.

CONCLUSION

Our political leadership has increasingly used the military to achieve predominately nonmilitary objectives, exposing a fundamental, operational flaw in American campaigning. That flaw is being able to coherently tie military and nonmilitary instruments to the overarching political objective in any war – setting conditions for a lasting peace and the end of hostilities. As the U.S. pursued more ideological interests of promoting democracy, ending human suffering and bringing regional stability, we discovered that the military, as efficient as it is in fighting and winning our nation's wars, was a clumsy instrument in this new arena. Our new political objectives require a delicate balance of the political, economic and informational instruments of national power in support of military might.

Post World War II Germany is a success story of post hostilities and transition to lasting peace unlikely to be repeated. The military had unequaled resources and access to political policy to achieve its end state. Panama was a minor excursion in comparison. A clear political vision and interagency involvement did little in synchronizing activities with the military. In both cases, planning for post hostilities took a back seat to war and became disjointed, crisis actions rather than deliberate plans.

Both the military and political leadership realized the military needed more integration with nonmilitary agencies to gain true synergy of all instruments of national power. The U.S. could not ignore interagency integration in the face of ever increasing SSCs. Neither political policy committees and POLMIL plans to force interdependence, nor joint doctrine stressing cooperation, coordination and solicitation created operational unity of effort.

The CINC requires an organization to integrate all instruments of power within his theater of operations. USJFCOM advocates a JIACP to perform operational integration at the operational level. MILLENIUM CHALLENGE 2002 will undoubtedly show significant advances in interagency coordination. This paper offers that the JIACP does not go far enough. The CIAP is such a mechanism to arm the CINC with a tool to provide greater integration with nonmilitary instruments specifically applied to the operational campaign. Only then will we have broken the glass ceiling of operational campaigning – transitioning from decisive combat operations to setting conditions for lasting peace.

"The object in war is to attain a better peace...Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire.....If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after-effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war....never lose sight of the post-war prospect in chasing the 'mirage of victory.'"⁵²

—B.H. Liddell Hart

word count: 6542

ENDNOTES

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 99.

² U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 September 2001), III-19.

³ Ibid., III-21.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Robert R. Soucy, II, Kevin A. Shwedo, and John S. Haven, II, "War Termination and Joint Planning," Joint Force Quarterly (Summer 1995): 95-101.

⁶ Harry G. Summers, Jr., "War: Deter, Fight, Terminate; The Purpose of War Is a Better Peace," Naval War College Review Vol. 39, (January-February 1986): 19.

⁷ Christopher M. Bourne, "Unintended Consequences of the Goldwater-Nichols Act." Joint Forces Quarterly (Spring 1998): 99.

⁸ J. G. Randall and David Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction, (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1969), 535.

⁹ J.F.C. Fuller, The Second World War (New York: Da Capo Press, 1948), 17.

¹⁰ Kenneth O. McCreedy, Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany, Monograph (Fort Leavenwoth: School of Advanced Military Studies, 19 May 1995), 7.

¹¹ Ibid., 6.

¹² Ibid., 8.

¹³ Wilfrid F. Knapp, A History of War and Peace: 1939 – 1965 (London: Oxford University Press, 1985), 33.

¹⁴ McCreedy, 33.

¹⁵ Ibid., 36.

¹⁶ Ibid., 37.

¹⁷ Jean E. Smith, Lucius D. Clay: An American Life (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1990), 331.

¹⁸ William Whipple, Jr., "A Review of Military Government in Germany," Military Review Vol. 27 (April 1947): 13-27.

¹⁹ Ibid., 27.

²⁰ Ibid., 22.

²¹ Smith, 328-395.

²² Charles W. Robinson, Panama: Military Victory, Interagency Failure: A Case Study of Policy Implementation, Monograph (Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1994), 4.

²³ Ronald H. Cole, Operation JUST CAUSE: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama February 1988 – January 1990 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the CJCS, Joint History Office, 1995), 7.

²⁴ Robinson, 4.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Cole, 11-12.

²⁷ Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 96-98.

²⁸ Cole, 32.

²⁹ Ibid., 35.

³⁰ Kevin Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 255-266.

³¹ Cole, 74.

³² Buckley, 255-266.

³³ William P. Hamblet and Jerry C. Kline, "Interagency Cooperation: PDD-56 and Complex Contingency Operations," Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 2000): 92-97.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff: Joint Publication 3-0, III-19.

³⁷ Hamblet and Kline, 92-97.

³⁸ James R. Bartran, PDD-56-1: Synchronizing Effects; Beyond the Pol/Mil Plan, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S Army War College, 9 June 2000).

³⁹ George T. Raach and Ilana Kass, "National Power and the Interagency Process," Joint Force Quarterly (Summer 1995): 8-13

⁴⁰ Bartran.

⁴¹ Hamblet and Kline, 92-97.

⁴² U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-08, Vol. I (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 October 1996), v.

⁴³ Ibid., ix.

⁴⁴ Ibid., ix-x.

⁴⁵ Hamblet and Kline, 92-97.

⁴⁶ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-08, II-6.

⁴⁷ John H. Eisenhour and Amb(ret) Edward Marks, "Herding Cats: Overcoming Obstacles In Civil-Military Operations," Joint Force Quarterly (Summer 1999), 86-90.

⁴⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-08, III-5.

⁴⁹ U.S. Joint Forces Command, A Concept for Improving U.S. Interagency Operational Planning and Coordination, White Paper (Norfolk: USJFCOM, March 2002)

⁵⁰ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, Joint Publication 3-57, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 8 February 2001), annex a., appendix b.

⁵¹ Scott W. Moore, "Today It's *Gold*, Not *Purple*," Joint Force Quarterly (Autumn/Winter 1998/1999): 100-106.

⁵² Basil H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd ed., (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), 366-371.

